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In this article, we empirically investigate the effect of Research and
Development (R&D) flows on patent flows around the world. We do this
using an unbalanced panel consisting primarily of Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries that have
both patent and R&D expenditure information broken down by domestic
and foreign sources. Our analysis shows that even among a fairly
homogeneous group of countries, the sources of patents and R&D differ
substantially. Using a dynamic panel framework, we find that domestic
R&D per capita increases domestic patents per capita only for the
European Patent Convention (EPC) countries that already have a
decentralized approach to innovation. Foreign R&D per capita increases
foreign patents per capita in all countries even though foreign R&D
constitutes a very small fraction of total R&D. We find that some of these
differences can be attributed to the locations of the patent applications,
including those to the European Patent Office (EPO), United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) and triadic patent applications to the
EPO, USPTO and Japan Patent Office (JPO) simultaneously.
I. Introduction
Innovation plays a critical role in achieving higher
rates of economic growth through perpetual change
and competition. Unfortunately, there is no direct
measure of innovation (Griliches, 1979). But what
aspects of economic activity can patent statistics
actually capture? As Griliches (1990) argues, one
would like to measure and understand the economic
processes that lead to the reduction in the cost of
producing existing products and the development of
new products by measuring both the inputs and
outputs of such processes. Ideally, patent statistics
would provide a measure of such output, so that we
have an indirect measure of innovation and the
opportunity to understand the underpinnings of such
processes. This understanding would eventually lead
to higher growth.1 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)
argue that although some discoveries are
serendipitous, most technological improvements
*Corresponding author. E-mail: kumazawar@duq.edu
1Unfortunately, patents are not going to be ideal proxies for the ‘output’ of the process owing to classification and intrinsic
variability.
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reflect purposeful Research and Development (R&D)
activity that is financed by private institutions or
government agencies.
At the micro level, Pakes and Griliches (1980),
among others, have shown strong relationships
between the number of patents and R&D expendi-
tures in cross-sectional data, implying that patents are
a good indicator of differences in inventive activity
across different firms. While the propensity to patent
differs significantly across industries, the relationship
between R&D and patents is almost proportional,
especially for firms above a minimal size. When
considering specific sources of funding for R&D,
Kortum and Lerner (2000) found that venture capital
may have accounted for 8% of industrial patents in
the US from 1983 to 1992. At a more aggregate level,
Park and Ginarte (1997) studied the relationship
between intellectual property rights and economic
growth for a cross-section of countries for the period
from 1960 to 1990. Their analysis focused on the
effects of intellectual property rights on growth using
a quantitative index. The researchers found that these
property rights affect economic growth indirectly by
stimulating the accumulation of factor inputs like
R&D and physical capital. The positive effects of
these rights on factor accumulation, particularly of
R&D capital, are present even when the analysis
controls for a more generalized measure of property
rights.
According to an Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) report,
technology diffusion is as important as innovations
themselves. An ideal patent system balances the
provision of returns to the inventor and the dissem-
ination of new technologies. The instruments that
should be adjusted in order to maintain this balance
are strength, breadth and duration of protection. An
increase in the value of any of these three instruments
leads to a higher reward for innovation but deceler-
ates the diffusion of new technology. Broad patent
protection might offer deficient incentives for second
innovators and inflate incentives for the first innova-
tion. Considering that broad patent protection
inhibits future innovation, it is important that inno-
vation is sustained into the future.
The literature to date has not fully explored
international patent flows. International patenting is
an important source of diffusion of technology since
it involves not only new products and processes but
also knowledge spillovers from the information
disclosed by inventors in exchange for patent protec-
tion. Bosworth (1984) studied patent application
flows in the UK in 1974 using a cross-sectional
sample and found that legal differences in patenting
across countries do not play significant roles in the
patent flows to and from the UK. In another study,
foreign patents registered in the US were volatile
across firms and countries of origin and reflected
differences in the costs of patenting (Chan et al.,
2004). Eaton and Kortum (1996) studied the deter-
minants of patenting and productivity for a cross-
section of OECD countries in the 1990s and found
that strong patent protection significantly stimulates
patenting, contrary to the earlier findings of
Bosworth (1984). Park (1999) considers a sample of
developed and developing countries and found that
stronger patent rights are instrumental in attracting
foreign technology and encouraging domestic
innovation.
However, international flows of R&D have been
analysed in recent years. Huggins et al. (2007) found
that North America has been the source of half of
R&D Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between 2002
and 2005 and that 10% of R&D affiliates are located
in developing countries. The overwhelming destina-
tions of such R&D FDI have been the rapidly
growing economies of Asia, China and India.
International flow of R&D has been gaining impor-
tance due to the recent transition away from the
traditional home-centred approach to a decentralized
cross-border approach to innovation (Huggins et al.,
2007). Belderbos et al. (2009) found a high degree of
elasticity of substitution between domestic and for-
eign R&D for a sample of Japanese multilateral firms
in the US. In a paper that analyses the extent to
which European firms engage in co-operative inno-
vation, Abramovsky et al. (2009) found evidence that
Spanish firms collaborate to overcome risks and
financial constraints.
As the literature suggests, there have not been
many papers that have analysed the flows of both
patents and R&D expenditures. This article studies
patent flows among a group of primarily industrial-
ized countries, while considering the incentives and
hurdles that entrepreneurs face at the micro level. In
order to do so, we explicitly take into account the
different patent systems and laws that different
entrepreneurs face when deciding where to patent
their innovation. In particular, we empirically explore
how expenditures on R&D, unobserved heterogene-
ity, as well as how distinct patent systems across the
world affect the number of patents that a particular
country receives from its citizens and by foreigners.
Our contribution to the literature is made in terms of
our investigation of the effect of R&D flows on
patent flows at the country level, reduced to catego-
ries of domestic and foreign sources. We find that
domestic R&D holds significance for domestic pat-
enting only for European Patent Convention (EPC)
countries. On the other hand, we find that foreign
4756 R. Kumazawa and P. Gomis-Porqueras
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R&D matters for foreign patenting for all countries,
despite the fact that the foreign R&D makes up a
minute fraction of total R&D. We also investigate
whether patent locations are affected by research
and development expenditures, and find that these
elements have an influence, primarily in EPC
countries.
II. The International Patenting System
The patent laws have been used in the past and
remain presently in use as instruments of national
economic policy, at least in part, to encourage the
establishment of new industries. As the business of
technology has become increasingly international,
forms of international cooperation have arisen that
make it easier to obtain multinational patent protec-
tions. A patent in a specific country provides protec-
tion from imitators from producing in that country
and from outside imitators selling in that country.
The Paris Convention2 of 1883 established the
International Union for the Protection of Industrial
Property in 1884. Members of the Union (referred to
as Convention countries3) are obliged to give subjects
of each Convention country the same protection and
advantages as those granted to their own nationals.
In other words, a Convention country cannot dis-
criminate against the citizens or subjects of another
Convention country. The Paris Convention also
established a ‘Convention Priority’. This entitles
anyone who applies for a patent, utility model
registration, industrial design registration or trade-
mark registration in a Convention country the right
to claim the filing date of their first application as an
effective filing date for corresponding applications
in other Convention countries. There are time limi-
tations on when these additional applications are filed
after the initial application. For patents, the time
limitation is 1 year. However, national novelty
requirements still apply to events taking place
before the initial application is filed so that disclosure
of the invention to the public prior to initial filing of
the application will prevent the granting of a valid
patent in many countries.
Almost a century later, the EPC came into effect in
1977. It established a single European Patent Office
(EPO) where a single patent application may be filed,
examined and approved for most of the EU. Under
the EPC, an approved application must be validated
in each of the designated countries to create national
patent rights in those countries. The system thus
results in what may be referred to as a ‘bundle’ of
national patents. The advantages of the European
patent system is the reduced cost involved in filing
and prosecuting a single application in one language
until the application has been approved. National
government fees, translation costs and foreign repre-
sentatives fees are all minimized. National patent
laws remain in effect in the various countries but have
been brought into agreement. The national systems
may be used as an alternative to the multinational
European patent system. Usually, this process is
carried out where protection is sought in only a small
number of European countries.
A decade later, in 1985, the Patent Cooperation
Treaty came into place. This treaty allowed residents
or nationals of member countries to file a single
international application at their local Patent Offices
(referred to as Receiving Offices). The application
may designate up to 45 countries or regional Patent
Offices, including the EPO. The application may
claim Convention Priority from an earlier application
or it may form the basis for a later claim for
Convention Priority. Once filed, the international
application is the subject of an international search
carried out by an International Searching Authority
(ISA). The ISA is not necessarily the Receiving
Office. Within 19 months after either the filing date
or the priority date of the international application,
whichever is earlier, the applicant must enter either
the second stage of the international application
process or a national phase in those countries where
protection is sought. In most cases, this is the
applicant’s choice. In the second stage of the inter-
national process, the application is the subject of a
preliminary examination by an International
Preliminary Examination Authority. This authority
establishes an opinion as to the patentability of the
invention as claimed. Within 30 months from the
earliest of the filing and priority dates, the application
must enter the national phase for those countries
where protection is to be obtained. Entering the
national phase is somewhat simpler than filing a
national application in the first instance, although
translations are required and national fees must
be paid.
2 The Paris Convention comprises the period from 1883 to 1967.
3 EPC countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland (including Liechtenstein), Turkey and the UK. Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Romania are considered as Extension States.
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Despite efforts to unify criteria for the development
of more comprehensive protection laws, there is still
a substantial amount of discrepancy among legal
frameworks. There are multiple national patent
systems, which continuously challenge investors
with opposing philosophies and examination rules,
not to mention translation requirements and separate
filing fees. In particular, the US patent system sharply
conflicts with other systems since the US maintains
an elaborate legal process for sorting out the prece-
dence of rival inventors regardless of their filing
date.4 On the other hand, the European system grants
a patent to the first party who files an application.
This difference in the patent law may force an
inventor to patent his invention in any number of
countries. Since there are several alternatives for
inventors to patent around the world, the inventor is
faced by the decision to apply for a patent in his own
country or abroad. If he chooses the latter, then he is
also faced with deciding from which countries he
should apply for a patent.
III. Model and Data
The relationship between patents and R&D can be
interpreted as a knowledge production function that
describes the production of patents from current and
past R&D investment, as first suggested by the
pioneering work of Pakes and Griliches (1980).
Together with Hausman et al. (1984), they considered
annual R&D expenditures of a firm to be invest-
ments, which add to a firm’s stock of knowledge. This
stock of knowledge is depreciating over time, so that
the contribution of older R&D investment becomes
less valuable with time. If there is persistence in the
R&D series so that lagged values of R&D are
collinear, Blundell et al. (1999) suggested a dynamic
linear feedback model.
Since our interest is in investigating patent and
R&D flows at the country level, we consider the
following relationship between patents and R&D
following the work by Blundell et al. (1999). This is
illustrated in Equation 1
Pijt ¼ kðRijt þ ð1 ÞRijt1 þ   Þij þ "ijt ð1Þ
where Pijt is the number of patents in country i by
residents of country j at time t, Rijt is the R&D
investment in country i by residents of country j that
depreciates exponentially at a rate of ,5 ij captures
the country-specific propensity for residents of
country j to patent in country i, k is a positive
constant and "ijt is the disturbance term. The
unobserved heterogeneity or the fixed-effect term,
ij, is time invariant and takes into account differ-
ences in patent laws, institutions, geographic charac-
teristics and enforcement of laws for residents of j.
Ignoring any feedback from patents to R&D, the
long-run steady state in country i by residents of
country j is given by the following expression:
Pij ¼ k

Rijij ð2Þ
so that may be interpreted as the long-run elasticity.
Inverting Equation 1, we have the following relation-
ship below in which E(vijt jRijt,Pijt,ij)¼ 06:
Pijt ¼ kRijtij þ ð1 ÞPijt1 þ vijt ð3Þ
The empirical estimation of our model is a dynamic
panel data equation shown in Equation 4, with the
lagged dependent variable as an independent variable
with the fixed-effect term, ij and a matrix of year
dummy variables, t:
Pijt ¼ tt þ  lnRijt þ Pijt1 þ ij þ vijt ð4Þ
Conventional fixed-effect estimation is problematic
due to the correlation of the lagged dependent
variable, a regressor, with the error term, a violation
of one of the major assumptions of the panel model.
Hence, Equation 4 can be estimated using the
Arellano–Bond Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991). First-
differencing of variables will sweep out the time-
invariant heterogeneity, ij. In our regression, the
first-differenced time dummy variables serve as
instruments in the estimation. Autocorrelation may
also be a problem since the lagged dependent variable
appears on the right-hand side of the equation
(Greene, 2007). Hence, the one-step GMM approach
uses the lagged first difference of Pijt1 as an
additional instrument. To keep the number of
instruments to a minimum, we only use one lag.
While it is relatively easy to find information on
patent applications by domestic and foreign sources
in each country, the same cannot be said of the flow
of R&D data. The World Intellectual Property
Indicators 2009 has information on patents applied
by residents and nonresidents in each country as early
as 1883 annually until present. The World Bank only
reports aggregate R&D expenditure data for most of
the countries but these are not broken down by
4The US system aims at fairness but at high litigation costs.
5 51 allows for a decreasing return to within period investments.
6Depending on the serial correlation structure of "ijt, the process vijt may display some autocorrelation.
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source. The Organization for Co-operation and
Development’s Science and Technology Statistics
only provides the relevant R&D flow information
(the amount originating in the country and the
amount originating from foreign sources) for just
the OECD countries plus a handful of non-OECD
countries from 1981.
Despite being a major source and destination for
innovative activity with a system that is different
from the European system, the US has no disaggre-
gated R&D information for any year. Due to the size
and importance of this country, we retain the US in
our regressions that utilize only aggregate R&D
information. Our sample consists only of 29 OECD
countries7 plus eight non-OECD countries8 that have
both patent flow data and R&D flow data plus the
US in an unbalanced panel that starts in 1981 and
ends in 2006. Unfortunately, while our data set
includes China, it does not include India. Like
Blundell et al. (1999), we also have pre-sample
information on patent flows before 1981. To deter-
mine whether the location of patent applications is an
important consideration, we also include the number
of patents to the EPO and to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO). Since an inventor
can also simultaneously file the same invention with
the EPO, USPTO and the Japan Patent Office (JPO),
known as triadic patent applications (or patent
families), we also include this information.
IV. Descriptive Statistics and Regression
Results
Table 1 summarizes the time-averaged patent and
R&D information for all countries in our data set.
There are significant differences in terms of patenting.
As the first three columns indicate, in 19 countries,
more patents are applied by foreign residents than
domestic residents and most of these countries,
surprisingly, do not belong in the EPC. The countries
with the highest patents are Japan and the US.
However, whilst Japan’s patents mostly originate
from domestic residents, only half of the patents in
the US originate from domestic residents. Korea and
China come in at distant third and fourth places, with
China also receiving half of its patents from foreign
residents. In general, smaller countries, such as
Luxembourg and Iceland, have smaller numbers of
patent applications. The last two rows in the table
highlight the similarities and differences between EPC
and non-EPC countries. In both EPC countries and
non-EPC countries, approximately a third of the
patents originate from foreign sources. The next three
columns indicate that there are also differences in the
destinations of the patent applications. For all
countries, the numbers of triadic patent applications
are much smaller than USPTO patent and EPO
patent applications. Japan and the US have more
triadic patent and USPTO patent applications than
other countries. Obviously, the EPC countries take
the advantage of patenting with the EPO but the rest
of the countries in the data set do so likewise.
Germany has more USPTO patents than any other
EPC country.
As the last three columns demonstrate, the major-
ity of the R&D comes from domestic sources in all
countries despite the significant differences in patent
flows. It is worth noting that in EPC countries,
foreign R&D makes up about 7% of the total R&D,
while in non-EPC countries, foreign R&D only
makes up about 1% of the total R&D. There is no
direct evidence to support the claims made by
Huggins et al. (2007) that China receives a large
fraction of R&D from foreign sources. The lack of
evidence is due to missing and fragmented data for
total R&D and foreign R&D. Again, the magnitude
of each country’s R&D differs by country size as is
indicated by the much larger total R&D for the US.
To overcome differences in patent applications and
R&D expenditures due to country size, all informa-
tion used in the regression analyses are converted to a
per capita basis by dividing all variables by the
population size in each country in every year.
Panels A–C in Table 2 present the Arellano–Bond
dynamic panel regression results for R&D per capita
on patents per capita by corresponding source. Panel
A looks at the effect of total R&D per capita on total
patents per capita, while Panels B and C break down
the analysis by domestic and foreign sources of
patents and R&D.
In all regressions in the three tables, the Sargan test
of over-identifying restrictions has been rejected,
while the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions
has not been rejected. STATA indicates that the
former is not a robust test despite not being weakened
by the number of instruments, while the latter is a
robust test that is weakened by the number of instru-
ments. Only the relatively more robust Hansen test
7Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and UK.
8Argentina, China, Israel, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovenia and South Africa.
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indicates that all instruments used are appropriate for
estimating the dynamic panel model, as demonstrated
by the failure to reject the null hypothesis. As the
number of instruments is kept to a minimum, the
robustness of this test is not weakened. The lack of
autocorrelation in first differences of order 2 (except
in one of the regressions) further establishes the
robustness of the regression estimates.
Panel A in Table 2 shows that total R&D per
capita has no statistically significant impact on total
patents per capita. Panel B shows that domestic R&D
per capita has a significant positive impact on
domestic patents per capita for EPC countries but
not for non-EPC countries. This observation suggests
that decentralized approaches to innovation (Huggins
et al., 2007), including foreign affiliates of companies,
may have more pertinence to the latter countries.
Finally, Panel C shows that foreign R&D per capita
has a significant positive impact on foreign patents
per capita. Foreign source of R&D may be important
for patents by foreign residents despite foreign R&D
per capita only constituting a small fraction of total
Table 1. Country data averaged for 1981 to 2006a
Patents R&D
Country Total Domestic Foreign Triadic EPO USPTO Total Domestic Foreign
Argentina 4077 934 3408 6 24 74 1468 1459 25
Australia 19 482 3310 16 172 252 604 1296 6438 6291 147
Austria 3004 2111 893 242 840 672 3312 2893 419
Belgium 1567 741 826 317 842 855 4402 3997 333
Canada 30 946 3178 27 767 432 1022 4732 12 376 11 084 1292
China 53 879 27 709 26 169 91 292 481 27 335 50 153 790
Czech Republic 3528 629 2859 11 48 59 1932 1885 62
Denmark 3289 1328 1961 191 556 577 2407 2004 134
Finland 5544 3357 2187 270 733 957 2888 3229 123
France 17 861 12 755 5106 2033 5514 4998 28 989 26 920 2069
Germany 49 757 39 037 10 721 5010 14 820 13 672 43 584 42 673 911
Greece 1430 681 749 7 41 35 872 635 150
Hungary 3615 1655 1959 32 97 134 1052 973 78
Iceland 273 33 240 3 14 19 117 103 10
Ireland 2205 776 1429 39 123 195 844 774 70
Israel 4950 1075 3875 208 512 1318 4242 3914 162
Italy 10 116 5375 3732 663 2727 2216 13 815 12 408 655
Japan 358 191 331 385 37 664 10 460 13 468 39 877 84 618 84 435 182
Korea 61 279 41 792 19 488 659 1073 4425 18 399 20 913 66
Luxembourg 247 54 193 15 49 45 436 397 19
Mexico 7844 568 7276 9 27 118 3208 3119 89
The Netherlands 3167 2078 1089 812 2110 1825 7211 6525 487
New Zealand 5433 1279 4154 33 89 191 719 724 34
Norway 5524 1043 4481 83 239 283 2010 1839 102
Poland 5662 3466 2196 8 41 36 2343 2333 78
Portugal 1189 97 1092 4 27 15 868 773 55
Romania 2734 2338 396 1 7 8 770 709 25
Russian Federation 31 371 23 175 8197 55 147 278 14 437 11 599 1076
Singapore 6122 343 5780 43 85 301 2440 2319 121
Slovak Republic 1371 226 1145 2 9 4 495 407 13
Slovenia 455 274 181 6 31 16 488 458 30
South Africa 8552 3389 5163 27 102 211 2083 2397 323
Spain 4837 2228 2610 110 501 378 5944 5617 327
Sweden 4898 3598 1300 640 1474 1686 7269 6546 252
Switzerland 4082 2744 1337 799 2019 2005 5077 5547 192
Turkey 1374 289 1084 5 32 16 2419 2392 27
UK 30 361 19 592 10 769 1562 4183 5693 25 551 21 967 3584
US 217 360 117 255 100 104 12 448 21 228 117 372 208 198
Average for all countries 25 726 17 418 8572 989 1993 5449 14 501 9525 392
Average for EPC countries 7328 4744 2534 608 1751 1717 7612 7096 476
Average for non-EPC countries 48 452 33 075 16 031 1460 2293 10 060 23 012 12 712 283
Notes: Patents are actual counts of patents applied. R&D expenditures are in millions of 2000 dollars and adjusted for
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). EPC stands for European Patent Convention.
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Table 2. Arellano–Bond dynamic panel results
All countries Countries in EPC Countries not in EPC
Panel A: Dependent variable¼ total patents
ln(Total R&D) 0.0011
(0.0038)
0.0059
(0.0064)
0.0005
(0.0016)
Total patents1 0.7529***
(0.1992)
0.6529***
(0.0442)
0.1935
(0.3063)
Includes year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 556 339 217
Number of countries 36 20 16
Average number of years 15 17 14
Wald 2 57 161 17 964 448
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 75.34*** 2¼ 105.59*** 2¼ 50.66***
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 9.82 2¼ 0.00 2¼ 0.00
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 1) z¼ 0.46 z¼ 0.87 z¼ 0.29
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 2) z¼0.81 z¼1.05 z¼1.41
Panel B: Dependent variable¼ domestic patents
ln(domestic R&D) 0.0005
(0.0008)
0.0001*
(0.00003)
0.0003
(0.0003)
Domestic patents1 0.7228***
(0.0703)
0.4994**
(0.2753)
0.6435***
(0.0276)
Includes year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 447 298 149
Number of countries 32 18 14
Average number of years 14 17 11
Wald 2 7512 449 70 076
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 90.08*** 2¼ 58.88*** 2¼ 54.92***
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 4.40 2¼ 0.00 2¼ 0.00
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 1) z¼ 0.35 z¼1.34 z¼0.40
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 2) z¼1.08 z¼ 0.01 z¼1.58
Panel C: Dependent variable¼ foreign patents
ln(foreign R&D) 0.0003**
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0003)
Foreign patents1 0.6032***
(0.1534)
0.5113
(0.3643)
0.6770***
(0.0326)
Includes year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 447 298 149
Number of countries 32 18 14
Average number of years 14 17 11
Wald 2 1193 48 164 19 121
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 66.15*** 2¼ 325.40*** 2¼ 44.87***
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 6.01 2¼ 0.00 2¼ 0.00
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 1) z¼0.55 z¼0.62 z¼ 1.40
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 2) z¼ 0.72 z¼0.54 z¼ 2.59***
Panel D: Dependent variable¼ triadic patents
ln(Total R&D) 0.00001*
(0.000009)
0.00001**
(0.000006)
0.00001*
(0.000006)
Triadic patents1 0.5566***
(0.2005)
0.5098***
(0.1730)
0.6205***
(0.1765)
Includes year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 529 317 212
Number of countries 37 20 17
Average number of years 14 16 12
Wald 2 1349 3393 2036
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 85.74*** 2¼ 87.81*** 2¼ 59.93***
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 1.25 2¼ 0.00 2¼ 0.00
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 1) z¼2.52** z¼3.17** z¼1.46
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 2) z¼ 1.85* z¼ 2.66*** z¼ 0.77
(continued )
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R&D per capita in all countries. However, the results
are not robust to separation of the data into
subsamples of EPC and non-EPC countries. While
intriguing, the methods used to generate this last
result did not control for the location of the patent
applications other than the identification of the
residence of the applicant. The next set of regressions
compares the importance of the locations of patent
applications against the resident or the nonresident
distinction of applications.
Panels D–F in Table 2 investigate whether total
R&D per capita matters for triad patents per capita,
USPTO patents per capita and EPO patents per
capita.9
Again, as in the previous tables, the Sargan test
and Hansen test give divergent conclusions regard-
ing the validity of the instruments used in the
regressions. As before, the more robust Hansen test
confirms the validity of the instruments. Unlike the
previous regressions, there is autocorrelation
of order 1 in first differences, which suggests
persistent autocorrelation. The presence of autocor-
relation in first difference of order 2 in more
regressions indicates that these results may not be
as robust as the previous regressions. For all
countries, total R&D per capita matters for all
types of patent applications per capita. In partic-
ular, Panel D in Table 2 indicates that for EPC
countries, total R&D per capita has a positive
effect on triadic patent applications per capita,
while for non-EPC countries, it has the opposite,
negative effect. This effect may be indicative of the
role that international collaboration and linkages
play, especially for the non-EPC countries that have
more divergent patenting environments than EPC
countries. Panels E and F indicate that total R&D
per capita has positive effects on EPO patents per
capita and USPTO patents per capita for European
Convention Countries, but has no impact on non-
Convention countries.
Table 2. Continued
All countries Countries in EPC Countries not in EPC
Panel E: Dependent variable¼EPO patents
ln(Total R&D) 0.00005**
(0.00002)
0.00003***
(0.00001)
0.000002
(0.00002)
EPO patents1 0.8159***
(0.1082)
0.8680***
(0.0823)
0.6586***
(0.1928)
Includes year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 590 360 230
Number of countries 37 20 17
Average number of years 16 18 14
Wald 2 2067 92 849 125 140
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 105.08*** 2¼ 97.47*** 2¼ 65.65***
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 15.80 2¼ 0.00 2¼ 0.00
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 1) z¼2.42** z¼3.09*** z¼1.65**
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 2) z¼0.16 z¼ 0.87 z¼1.36
Panel F: Dependent variable¼USPTO patents
ln(Total R&D) 0.00002
(0.00001)
0.00002**
(0.00001)
0.00005
(0.00003)
USPTO patents1 0.9177***
(0.0429)
0.8596***
(0.0832)
0.8768***
(0.0986)
Includes year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 590 360 230
Number of countries 37 20 17
Average number of years 16 18 14
Wald 2 79 161 6108 533 981
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 134.26*** 2¼ 95.03*** 2¼ 66.99***
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 2¼ 24.58 2¼ 0.00 2¼ 0.00
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 1) z¼2.68*** z¼2.39** z¼1.71*
Arellano–Bond test (H0: no autocorrelation of order 2) z¼ 1.63 z¼ 1.77* z¼ 0.81
Notes: Robust SEs in parentheses below coefficients.
***, ** and * denote test statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
9 Since domestic R&D per capita and foreign R&D per capita had no impact in any regression, these results are not reported.
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V. Conclusions
The results indicate that the sources of patents and
R&D differ for most OECD countries and a select
few non-OECD countries. Dissecting the domestic
and foreign sources of R&D and patents allowed for
a country-level analysis of international patent and
R&D flows using an unbalanced panel. Domestic
R&D per capita increases domestic patents only for
the EPC countries that have existing decentralized
approaches to innovation. Foreign R&D per capita
increases foreign patents per capita even though
foreign R&D constitutes a miniscule fraction of total
R&D for the countries in our data set.
This study also investigated the impact of total
R&D per capita on patent locations. We used
USPTO patents per capita, EPO patents per capita
and a combination of both patent sources with JPO
as triadic patents per capita. We find that total R&D
per capita has a positive effect on total triadic,
USPTO and EPO patents per capita for European
Convention countries. For non-Convention coun-
tries, total R&D per capita only matters for triadic
patents per capita but a puzzling negative effect was
identified which needs further attention.
A lack of detailed R&D data that separated the
information into domestic and foreign sources
created a lack of cross-sectional variation in the
unbalanced panel. Most countries in our sample are
OECD countries and therefore not competing for
significant roles as recipients of R&D FDI as
developing countries (Huggins et al., 2007). In
order to account for this shortcoming, future
research needs to include developing countries like
India, provided that the R&D flow data becomes
available. Finally, the small sample size may have
contributed to the divergent test results for the
validity of instruments used in the dynamic panel
estimations. All things considered, this article pro-
vides important empirical evidence that contributes
to the existing literature regarding the correlation
between international flows of R&D and patents, as
well as locations of patent applications.
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